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God bless pawnbrokers!
They are quiet men.
You may go once-
You may go again-
They do not question
As a brother might;
They never say
What they think is right;
They never hint
All you ought to know;
Lay your treasure down,
Take your cash and go,
Fold your ticket up
In a secret place
With your shaken pride
And your shy disgrace,
Take the burly world
By the throat again-
God bless pawnbrokers!
They are quiet men.
-Marguerite Wilkinson
I. INTRODUCTION
P AWNSHOP. The word evokes a picture of a small, dirty shop in a
blighted neighborhood where down-and-out derelicts resignedly
pawn the last of their worldly goods, where fast-talking youths furtively
pawn their latest "hot" merchandise, and quickly disappear, and where
the pawnbroker demands his "pound of flesh" by imposing usurious
rates. Yet pawnshops deserve neither to be characterized as the scoun-
drels of the lending industry nor legislated out of existence. They per-
form a useful, and probably necessary function in our economic system,
just as they have for centuries.
Pawnshops are frequented by persons from all strata of society, from
Beverly Hills to the Bowery. There are as many reasons to use pawn-
shops as there are needs to borrow money. Pawnshops serve several dis-
tinct types of clients: persons of some economic wealth in urgent need of
short term funds; persons operating on the fringes of legality with prop-
erty to pledge but no other source of credit; artisans, petty traders, and
persons periodically unemployed; and the ever present urban poor.
Consider the case of Mary. Mary is an elderly woman who lives on a
fixed monthly income in Bradenton, Florida. Her limited monthly in-
come stretches just so far, and often her money runs out before the end of
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the month. When it does, she visits her local pawnshop to pawn some of
her jewelry for a little extra money to see her through until the next
check. When it finally arrives, she redeems her jewelry, keeping it in re-
serve for the next tight squeeze.1 Another example involves a womap, all
alone in a strange city, who loses her purse. Stranded with no money, she
is able to pawn her watch and thus raise enough money to return home. 2
While most of the sums loaned on pawns are small, usually less than
fifty dollars, some are relatively large-one Chicago pawnbroker loaned
a business executive $65,000 to clinch a fast-breaking business deal; pre-
sumably, there was no time for this individual to follow more conven-
tional loan procedures.3 For years in New York City, just across Fifth
Avenue from Tiffany's, there existed a pawnshop for the well-to-do. The
three gold balls, the standard symbol of a pawnbroker, were nowhere to
be seen; instead there was a stylish little sign reading "Kaskel-Loans on
Jewelry and Furs." The windows displayed expensive jewelry and furs,
and the vault contained such items as a $150,000 diamond necklace.4
Pawnshops are a ready source for quick cash to remedy a short term
liquidity crisis: for example, when the student loan check will not arrive
for three more weeks, but the textbooks are needed now. The loan is
immediate and relatively anonymous; there is no credit investigation and
there is none of the embarrassment or chiding that comes when parents
or friends are asked for money. There is not even a requirement that the
loan be paid back-no harassing phone calls or letters, and no danger of
a ruined credit rating.
If a pawn loan on a watch goes bad, we sell the watch, and we're glad to see
the customer next time .... If a bank loan goes bad, they sue the guy, ruin
his credit rating for life and call him a deadbeat the next time. You tell me
which is more humane.5
Pawnshops are easy to use. Simply bring in an item of personal
property, such as a diamond tie tac, and the pawnbroker will appraise it.
Typically, the borrower will have in mind the initial cost or the sentimen-
tal value of that exquisite tie tac, and will be disappointed with the low
valuation assigned by the pawnbroker. However, the pawnbroker must
1. Kirschenmann, Pawnbrokers: New Law Hurts The Little Guy, Bradenton Herald, Sept. 4,
1984, at B1, col. 1.
2. Ever Use a Pawnshop, 26 CHANGING TIMEs 33 (1972).
3. Id. See also Pedersen, Pawnshops Strike Gold, NEWSWEEK, March 16, 1987, at 53.
4. Pawnshops DeLuxe, FORTUNE, Oct. 1954, at 234. Unfortunately, in Oct. 1973, this particular
pawnshop went out of business because of rent increases. However, pawnshops for the rich still do
flourish. P. SCHWED, GOD BLESS PAWNBROKERS 196 (1975).
5. Pedersen, supra note 3.
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base her valuation on current market demand, the condition of the prop-
erty, and probable resale value in a few months if the property is not
redeemed.
To consummate the transaction, the pawnbroker keeps the property
and gives the borrower the money and a pawn ticket. The ticket states
the amount the borrower must pay to redeem the property, and the date
by which the property must be redeemed. Redemption periods and ser-
vice charges or "interest rates" vary widely from state to state.6 Informa-
tion on the percentage of pawns that are actually redeemed is scanty. The
information available suggests variances in the redemption rate depend-
ing on the type of merchandise and the jurisdiction.7 If the redemption
period expires without any payments having been made by the borrower,
the pawnbroker has the right to sell the pawn. Usually, the sale of the
pawn terminates all liability of the pawnbroker to the borrower, and
vests in the purchaser all rights, title, and interests of both the pawn-
broker and the borrower.8
These sales are an important source of additional revenue for the
pawnbroker. For example:
Cash America, a publicly owned chain of Texas pawnshops, benefits
from its own bum deals: the sale of unredeemed goods netted a $1.8 million
profit in the first three quarters of 1986. The company brought in another
$3.5 million in interest income from loans that "worked." 9
In some states, when the pawn is sold, the pawnbroker is entitled to keep
only so much of the proceeds as will pay the obligation, and any surplus
must be held for a period of time in order that the pledgor might reclaim
6. See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1624, 1625 (1988) (3% per month interest rate limit
and four month redemption period); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 21200.5, 21201 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989)
(variable monthly interest rate depending on the balance of principal and four month redemption
period for fur and clothing but six month period for eveything else); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 17, para.
4652, 4660 (1988) (3% monthly interest limit and a holding period of one year from date of default
of interest payment); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 45-6-210, 45-6-211 (1987) (24 % per year plus permissi-
ble to charge fee for storage, insurance, closing loan and reporting and a redemption period of 50
days after maturity of loan).
7. Oregon reported redemption rates of approximately 84% and Indiana reported 86%. See
1984-1985 Ind. Dep't Fin. Inst. Ann. Rep. 57-60 [hereinafter Ind. Rep.]; 1985 Or. Dep't Com. Ad-
min. Fin. Inst. Ann. Rep. 62-63 [hereinafter Or. Rep.]. For other examples: one pawnbroker reports
redemption rates of 80% for guns, 60-70% for jewelry, and only 30% for general merchandise.
Tarnowski, People, Business Turn To Pawnshops, BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, July
18, 1982, at 67:C14, 67:DI. Another report cites redemption rates as averaging greater than 85%.
Warfel, For Pawnshops, a Bad Economy is Good For Business, BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT, March 29, 1982, at 40:F5.
8. See, eg., FLA. STAT. § 715.04(3) (1987).
9. Pedersen, supra note 3.
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it. If, on the other hand, the pawnbroker has made a miscalculation, and
the property sells for less than the loan that it "secured," the pawnbroker
cannot charge the pledgor with the deficiency. Interestingly, Oregon and
Indiana have similar redemption rates.10 Yet, Indiana requires sales sur-
plus to be paid to the debtor; and in Oregon, the debtor forfeits any sur-
plus if he fails to redeem the item pawned."'
Technically, a pawn is very similar to a pledge. A pledge is a bail-
ment of personal property as security for a debt, redeemable upon certain
terms, with the holder of the pledge having the implied power of sale on
default.12 In order to be a pawn however, the property delivered must be
tangible personal property. Therefore, a delivery of commercial paper,
which could be a valid pledge, could not constitute a pawn. 13 The essen-
tial elements of either a pledge or a pawn are that physical possession of
the property must be transferred from the pledgor to the pledgee, with
legal title remaining in the pledgor. 14
A pawn transaction may also be structured in the nature of a buy-
sell agreement. Because usury rates and interest ceilings apply to loans of
money, there may be a powerful incentive for pawnbrokers to classify the
agreement as a sale rather than a loan. The Florida Statutes, for exam-
ple, include a two-prong definition of a pawn: a bailment of personal
property as security for a debt, and an agreement under which the pur-
chaser will hold the pawn for a specified period of time, and allow the
10. Ind. Rep. and Or. Rep., supra note 7.
11. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 28-7-5-32 (Bums 1988); OR. REv. STAT. § 726.400 (3) (1985).
12. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Moneylenders and Pawnbrokers § 1 (1971 & Supp. 1986).
13. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Secured Transactions § 50 (1973 & Supp. 1986). See Commercial Bank of
Jacksonville, Fla. v. Flowers, 116 Ga. 219, 12 S.E. 474 (1902) (holding that commercial paper is only
symbolic of property).
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (4th ed. 1968).
15. In the states which do not specifically prescribe limits on interest that may be charged by
pawnbrokers, consideration must be given to whether the transaction is then subject to the state's
general usury law. Research indicated only one state, Arkansas, that appears to have judicially ap-
plied the general usury law to a pawn-loan transaction. See Sleeper v. Sweetster, 274 Ark. 477, 446
S.W. 2d 228 (1969). See also Sparks v. Robinson, 66 Ark. 460, 51 So. 460 (1899).
If, instead of a pawn-loan, the transaction is structured as a sale-buy back, the usury law probably
does not apply. Because usury laws are in degredation of the common law, they are to be strictly
construed. In the sale-buy back, the borrower "sells" property to the lender and is given an option to
buy it back at a price slightly above what the seller received plus the highest legal contract rate of
interest. This is a sale, not a loan, and hence is not within usury prohibitions. See generally Oeltjen,
Usury: Utilitarian or Useless?, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 169, 187-88 (1975). Note, however, that some
states provide that pawnbrokers cannot purchase personal property agreeing to sell it back to the
seller at a price in excess of the original purchase price, plus a service charge, not to exceed the
statutory interest rate limit. See IND. CODE §§ 28-7-5-28 [1](d) (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 226-080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1989).
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seller the exclusive right to redeem. 16
There is an old joke about a man who was trying to raise a certain
amount of money, which he needed desperately, by pawning his watch.
He wasn't succeeding very well with the one-eyed pawnbroker until he
poured out his sad story of need. The only way he finally knew he was
going to get the required amount was when he saw the gleam of sympa-
thy in the pawnbroker's glass eye.
17
The word "pawnbroker" is formed by a combination of "pawn" (a
pledge given as security for a loan) plus "broker" (agent). The term "bro-
ker" is a bit misleading because a pawnbroker is no one's agent. He runs
his own business, lending money for a charge by using retained personal
property as security. The Oxford English Dictionary records 1637 as the
year the term "pawnbroker" first appeared in print."8 However, the his-
tory of this trade is much older; indeed it may be one of the world's
oldest professions.
The pawnbroker is the bailee of the goods he holds. He must exer-
cise a bailee's standard of care. 9 Indeed, much of the pawnbroker's over-
head is devoted to protecting the pawns from theft. A pawnbroker
typically must register with the police department, and keep detailed
records, in addition to procuring a business or occupational license from
the city, county, or state. Most states require the pawnbroker to check
the identification of the borrower, and to record the date of the transac-
tion, the identity of the borrower, and a description of the property
pawned.2° This is to assist law enforcement authorities in tracking down
stolen goods, and to minimize the use of pawnbrokers as "fences."
The symbol representing a pawnshop, the three golden globes (or
three brass balls, depending on one's point of view) are as internationally
recognizable as the symbol representing the Red Cross. However, the
origin of this symbol is lost to antiquity. It is many centuries old, dating
back at least to the Middle Ages. At a time when illiteracy was wide-
spread, these signs were probably indispensable as a method of communi-
16. FLA. STAT. § 715.04 (1) (1987).
17. P. SCHWED, supra note 4, at 21.
18. VII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 576 (2d ed. 1970).
19. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Secured Transactions § 50 (1973 & Supp. 1986).
20. See, e.g., ARXz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1622 A (1988); CAL FIN. CODE § 21202 (West 1986
& Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. § 715.041(1) (1986 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 28-7-5-16, 19, 20
(West 1986); N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:22-13 (1986); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 43 (McKinney 1988);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 91-4 (1986); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 281-11, 281-13 (Purdon 1986); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-51.09(a) (Vernon 1986).
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cating the nature of the business transacted within the establishment. 21
The most frequently related story of the origin of this sign is that it was
derived from the Medici coat of arms. The Medici were early bankers in
Italy, and among the first moneylenders in England.2 2 However, the
Medici coat of arms bore roundels, which are disks and not spheres; fur-
thermore, these roundels were not gold, and varied in number from six to
eleven, but never three.23
There are also many colorful, anecdotal versions of the origin of the
three golden balls. One story relates that the Medici, originally a tribe of
medicine men, acquired the three balls as a coat of arms when one of the
Medici forebearers, fighting for Charlemagne, slew a giant who attacked
him with three golden balls.2 4 According to another source, the early
sign of a pawnbroker was three bowls which were generally blue; by the
eighteenth century the bowls had become balls and by the end of the
eighteenth century had changed from blue to gold.23 It is suggested that
the balls assumed a golden exterior to gild the pill for those who deal
with pawnbrokers.26
Another suggested origin of the three golden balls is associated with
the legend in which St. Nicholas gave three bag-shaped purses of gold to
three noblemen's daughters so that they could marry.2 7 Or perhaps those
three swaying bags of gold represent the symbols of Faith, Hope, and
Charity.28 A more cynical explanation is that the balls represent the fact
that there are two chances to one that whatever you brought in will not
be redeemed.2 9
While the odds are probably less than two to one that the origin of
the symbolic golden balls will ever be verified, there is general consensus
on the origin of the word "pawn". Pawn is derived from the French
"pan" which means the skirt of a gown. Pan, in turn, is derived from the
Latin word for cloth, "pannum."' ° It appears that at one time garments
and cloth were common objects to pawn. This is not surprising in an era
when the vast majority of the populace owned little personal property,
21. Donovan, Lo, the Poor Pawnbroker, 10 LAw & Soc'Y J. 443, 449 (1940).
22. W. MORRIS & M. MORRIS, DICTIONARY OF WORD AND PHRASE ORIGINS 436 (1971)
[hereinafter W. MORRIS].
23. A. WHITTICK, SYMBOLS, SIGNS AND THEIR MEANING 112 (1961).
24. W. MORRIS, supra note 22.
25. A. WHITriCK, supra note 23.
26. Donovan, supra, note 21, at 449.
27. A. WnrrrIcK, supra note 23.
28. Strakoscb, Brother to Shylock, 117 THE CENTURY MAGAZINE 394, 395 (1929).
29. Donovan, supra note 21, at 449.
30. J. SHIPLEY, DICTIONARY OF WORD ORIGINS 263 (2d ed. 1945).
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and what was owned was relatively indispensable. Under these circum-
stances, a fancy garment would indeed be a wise choice to pawn.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Upon the outermost Head of that seventh circle...
Where sat the melancholy folk (the usurers)
Out of their eyes was gushing forth their woe.
-Dante, Divine Comedy, Inferno: Canto VII
Pawnbroking is the oldest method of lending money in history,31 so
old, in fact, that there has been no time in recorded history when a loan
of money on a pledge has not been available.32 It was known to exist in
China as early as 2,000 to 3,000 years ago. Pledge transactions were valid
contracts under both Greek and Roman law. In fact, the Emperor Au-
gustus Caesar founded a business of lending on pledges in 31 B.C.33
Pawnbroking, as we know it today, became more clearly distin-
guishable in the Middle Ages when credit systems were largely undevel-
oped.34 Consequently, many small businesses were financed through
pawnbrokers who transformed material capital into desperately needed
liquid funds in a manner not greatly dissimilar to that used by today's
business financiers. Yet, as now, the mainstay of the pawnshop business
was the lending of small sums on household goods.35
In the Middle Ages, lending on pledges was a trade practiced almost
exclusively by the Jews and the Lombards of Northern Italy, whose fi-
nancing endeavors spread throughout Europe. In the tenth or eleventh
century, the Jews were partly supplanted by the Lombards. This was due
mainly to the fact that the former had been outcast or exiled from many
areas, including England in 1297.36
Where such lending was not prohibited, interest ceilings became in-
creasingly common. As early as 1206, a French ordinance forbade Jews
from charging more than 431/3 percent interest.37 However, while there is
little documentation on this point, it seems likely that the state-imposed
interest ceilings did little to curb abuses in interest charges. Local regula-
31. P. SCHWED, supra note 4, at 21.
32. Id. at 210.
33. Id.
34. See F. BRAUDEL, 1 THE STRUCTURES OF EVERYDAY LIFE - THE LIMITs OF THE POSSi-
BLE 436-78 (1979).
35. VI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Pawnbroking 33-34 (1987).
36. Id.
37. Is it Right to Take Interest?, 9 THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS 606, 607 (1894).
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tion would only prompt the moneylender to relocate just outside the mu-
nicipal limits. During times of thriving trade and commerce, there was a
great demand for liquid capital, and covert pledge operations would have
been difficult to police.
Another approach to curb the excesses of private pawnbroking was
the establishment of public pawnshops. Among the earliest experiments
were the public pawnshops in Freising, Germany in 1198 and in Salans,
Burgundy in 1350.38 However, it is generally conceded that the first ma-
jor, successful public pawnshop originated in Perugia, Italy, circa 1450."9
There, two Franciscan monks went begging until they had enough
money to open a "lending house" where the poor could obtain small
loans on the pledge of personal property. Soon after its creation, the en-
terprise was moved to Rome where this mons pietatis, or bank of pity,
flourished. The montes were permitted to charge a small, Church ap-
proved fee to cover the expenses incurred to administer the business and
to care for the pawns." The concept spread throughout Europe and else-
where, and public pawnshops currently exist in varying forms in Italy,41
Germany,42 Spain,43 Austria,' France,45 Holland, 46 and Mexico.4 7
The United States has never had either nationally operated pawn-
shops or national regulation of pawnbrokers. State pawnbroker legisla-
tion began to appear in the early 1880's. As a general matter, the early
legislation imposed few restrictions. For example, an 1823 Pennsylvania
statute merely granted authority to the cities or counties to pass such
pawnshop ordinances as they saw fit. 8 Pursuant to this statute, in 1856
Philadelphia passed an ordinance requiring pawnbrokers to pay a fee of
$200, to file a bond of $1,000 and to obtain a $5,000 insurance policy in
order to be granted a license.49 Several subsequent regulations were en-
acted to ensure the good character of the pawnbroker or to enforce ap-
38. P. SCHWED, supra note 4, at 24.
39. Condon, The Bank of Pity, 33 HOLIDAY 58 (1963).
40. S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 79 (1963).
41. See Kumlien, Misery that Pays, 53 THE COMMONWEALTH 194, 195 (1950).
42. P. SCHWED, supra note 4, at 24.
43. Id.
44. See, eg., Of Rags and Iron Roses, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 12, 1970, at 96; In Hock to Aunt Dora,
BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 26, 1963, at 31.
45. See Moffett, Paris Pawnshops, 65 THE CENTURY MAGAZINE 327, 328-37 (1903).
46. S. HOMER, supra note 40.
47. The data on Mexico were largely drawn from Condon, supra note 39, at 58.
48. PA. STAT. ANN tit. 53, § 7601 (Purdon 1931), cited in Note, Pawnbroker Regulation and the
Pennsylvania Act, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 104, 108 n.40 (1940).
49. Id.
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propriate record keeping for police purposes. In 1861, pawnbrokers had
the dubious distinction of being the first designated class of lenders
whose activities were regulated under California law.50
Even though municipal pawnshops never developed in the United
States, there is a history of philanthropic individuals pooling their funds
to operate successful charitable pawnshops. The first of these, the Massa-
chusetts Pawner's Bank of Boston, later renamed the Collateral Loan
Company, was founded in 1859. While it had a rather inauspicious begin-
ning, by 1873 it began to increase its business volume."1
The best known and most successful of the philanthropic pawnshops
is the Provident Loan Society. Formed in 1894, its goal was to "divorce
the three balls from the three Furies." 2 In the early years of growth,
branch offices were established in ghetto districts. As business expanded,
branches were opened in business districts. 3 Although the business vol-
ume of Provident Loan Society has declined in recent years, it is still an
active enterprise. In the early 1970's there were in excess of 40,000 loans
extended through the eight branches still operating in New York. 4
Throughout this period, state regulation of pawnbroking varied
state to state and an early attempt at uniform legislation could hardly be
termed a success. A model Uniform Pawnbrokers Act was drafted, circa
1918, and it incorporated many of the business practices then in use by
the Provident Loan Society.5" This Uniform Act was approved by the
National Federation of Remedial Loan Associations in 1922.56 However,
50. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 21000-21209 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989).
51. Mottershead, Pawn Shops, 196 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICA ACADEMY 149, 153 (1938).
52. P. SCHWED, supra note 4, at 23.
53. Id. at 26. The following chart indicates the volume of services performed by the Provident
Loan Society in its early years.
Provident Loan Society
(approximate annual statistics)
Number of Amount of
Year Loans Loans Average Loan
1895 20,000 $ 350,000 $17
1900 100,000 $ 2,000,000 $20
1910 400,000 $12,000,000 $30
1920 400,000 $30,000,000 $75
1930 500,000 $40,000,000 $80
1939 750,000 $35,250,000 $47
The $40 million loaned on pledges in the very early 1930's is to this date the largest amount ever
loaned. Id at 26-27.
54. Id. at 195.
55. Mottershead, supra note 51, at 152.
56. Id.
PAWNBROKING ON PARADE
the Act received little support in state legislatures, being followed, and
only loosely at that, in Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New York.5 7
III. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
Let us all be happy and live within our means,
even if we have to borrow the money to do it with.
-Artemus Ward
A. The Legitimization of Consumer Credit
For the last few decades, pawnshops have lived a Darwinian exist-
ence; only the fittest have survived. In some areas, suffocating statutes, a
period of rapid inflation, and a cornucopia of consumer credit options
coalesced to virtually eradicate this class of lenders."8 Increased credit
availability enables marginal risk borrowers to acquire funds from
sources other than pawnbrokers and loan sharks. Thus, not only must
pawnbrokers draw their clientele from a shrunken, yet high risk, pool of
borrowers, in many states they are also shackled by outdated interest rate
limits. In New York, the decline in the numbers of pawnbrokers was so
dramatic, 150 licenses in 1935 versus 35 in 1975,19 that legislation was
enacted in 1980 to raise the maximum permissible rates on pawn transac-
tions for the first time in over ninety years.6 In contrast, in Texas, where
applicable usury ceilings are relatively high, pawnshops have flourished;
there are currently 800 existing shops. This success is best exemplified by
Cash America Investments, the first U.S. pawn-loan company to go pub-
lic. 61 The stock, initially offered at ten dollars in January, 1987,62 closed
at over fifteen dollars by the second week of March, 1987.
Although pawnshops compete against many sources of consumer
credit, the rise of consumer finance companies has been especially signifi-
cant. As previously discussed, in the early 1900's consumer cash loans
became essential for individuals to meet cash flow emergencies. This need
led to a reliance on illegal moneylenders, which in turn prompted the
creation of legislation to protect these necessitous borrowers from exorbi-
tant interest charges. However, the transaction costs of small cash loans
are high, and most lenders could not profitably make these loans, even at
57. Id.
58. Bank, No Future, No Mourners, FORBES, Oct. 29, 1979, at 72.
59. P. SCHWED, supra note 4, at 197.
60. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 46 (McKinney 1988).
61. Pedersen, supra note 3.
62. Id. See also Abelson, Up & Down Wall Street, BARRONS, Feb. 2, 1987, at 43.
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the general maximum rate of interest.63 Borrowers with insufficient in-
come or collateral were too "high risk" to have access to these limited
interest rate loans, and thus they continued to turn to loan sharks.
The solution was to establish publicly regulated, privately owned
finance companies to extend small consumer loans, and to allow a rate of
interest sufficiently high to cover costs and attract working capital. 64 Be-
tween 1911 and 1916, six states enacted legislation regulating consumer
finance companies. 65 Then in 1916, the Russell Sage Foundation drafted
the Uniform Small Loan Law as a method of fighting loan sharks. 66 To-
day, every state has small consumer loan legislation, much of it influ-
enced by the Russell Sage Act.
With the passage of time, there evolved a new philosophy regarding
consumer credit. No longer was borrowing a stigma, a sign of poverty, or
financial mismanagement. Rather borrowing became the American way
to instantly raise one's standard of living. 7 Indeed, it became desirable
economic policy to facilitate consumer credit and thereby accelerate the
movement of goods and services in the marketplace. Consumers accepted
their duty to borrow with enthusiasm, and the availability of consumer
credit exploded.
Between 1960 and 1982 outstanding consumer credit increased
more than sixfold.68 Undoubtedly, one reason for the large volume of
consumer debt is that the relatively high interest rates consumer finance
companies are allowed to charge enable more "high risk" borrowers to
gain access to funds. One study found that the largest group of consumer
finance company borrowers is comprised of blue collar wage earners who
earn less than the median family income.6 9 This is the same clientele
who, more than likely, had been previously served by pawnbrokers and
loan sharks rather than by banks.
63. J. CHAPMAN & R. SHAY, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY: ITS COST AND REGULA-
TION 11-12 (1967).
64. Id. at 12.
65. Massachusetts: Ch. 7272, 1911 Mass. Acts 882; Michigan: No. 228, 1915 Mich. Publ. Acts
383; New Jersey: Ch. 49, 1914 N.J. Laws 75; Oregon: Ch. 278, 1913 Or. Laws 527; Pennsylvania:
Ch. 432, 1915 Pa. Laws 1012.
66. The Russell Sage Foundation was incorporated in New York in 1907 for the purpose of
improving social conditions. See McReynolds, Legislative Remedies Possible Under the Missouri
Constitution of 1945, 16 Mo. L. REv. 292, 294 (1951).
67. J. CHAPMAN & R. SHAY, supra note 64, at 12.
68. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 513 (103d ed. 1982-83) [hereinafter U.S. DEPT OF COM.].
69. For example, in 1964 the median family income for consumer finance borrowers was $5,747
vs. $6,569 for all families. J. CHAPMAN & R. SHAY supra note 64, at 18.
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When credit standards are lowered to serve higher risk borrowers,
defaults increase, and collection and business costs rise. For these lenders
to stay in business, the rate of interest needs to be set at a level high
enough to attract business and working capital, yet low enough to enable
consumers to receive cash loans at a charge reasonably related to the risk
assumed and costs involved. Studies indicate that even with these rela-
tively high rates of interest, consumer finance companies are not exploit-
ing borrowers; the rates charged appear reasonbly related to risk
incurred.70
Consumer finance companies have admirably fulfilled their purpose
of making consumer loans available to persons who otherwise would not
have access to borrowed funds.71 Although the pawnbrokers are not in
direct competition with the consumer finance companies, pawnbrokers
have suffered the impact of this increased availability of credit.
Persons in need of funds who are even too high a risk for a con-
sumer finance company have two choices: if they need small sums and
have personal property to pawn, they can visit their "uncle"; if they need
larger sums or have nothing to pawn, it is off to the loan shark. Because
many pawnbrokers deal with high risk borrowers, rejected by finance
companies, it is pertinent to examine some of the reasons why these com-
panies reject high risk borrowers and how these rejections affect
pawnbrokers.
Low interest rate ceilings alone naturally lead to less "high risk"
lending and higher rejection rates by consumer finance companies. 72 To
the extent that pawnbrokers are not subject to rate restrictions similar to
consumer finance companies, this would operate in the pawnbrokers'
favor. Some relatively safe loans will be rejected by consumer finance
companies, and these borrowers will find the ancient alternative attrac-
tive, especially since the pawnbrokers' loans are usually more easily col-
lateralized. The combination of low interest rate ceilings, and high
market interest rates produces results which are even more Draconian:
the margin between the cost of capital and the rate lenders are allowed
charge is reduced or eliminated. This leads to more selective lending
practices by consumer finance companies, which in turn futher increases
70. From 1960-64, average net profits for three institutions were as follows: large consumer
finance companies-l1.9%; private manufacturing companies-9.8%; member federal reserve
banks-9.2%. Id. at 19.
71. In 1980, finance companies extended in excess of $22 million in personal cash loans alone.
U.S. DEP'T OF COM., infra note 119, at 510.
72. Greer, An Economic Analysis of Consumer Credit Markets in the US., IV NATIONAL
COMM'N. ON CONSUMER FIN.-TECHNICAL STUDIES 95-101 (1972).
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rejection rates.73
While pawnshops profit from the high rejection rates of other lend-
ers, pawnbrokers are also subject to the same market forces as other
lenders. To the extent that pawnbrokers, like their lending competitors,
are also governed by regulations affecting interest rates, they may not be
able to take advantage of the increased rejection rates of finance compa-
nies, and their own rate ceilings may make mere survival a struggle. For
example, Chicago had sixty licensed pawnbrokers in 1959; by 1979, the
number was down to six. A frequently cited reason for the decline in
number was that soaring interest rates drove pawnbrokers out of
business.74
The heavy regulation of consumer finance companies also contrib-
utes to these companies' rate of rejection for high risk borrowers. Studies
indicate that high barriers to entry into a lending market, such as licens-
ing, strict regulation, and fees, reduce the concentration ratio of lenders
which in turn results in a reduction of available credit and an increase in
rejection rates.75 Thus, tight regulation of finance companies should in-
crease the pool of potential pawnshop patrons. The amount of business
pawnbrokers draw from this pool will depend on how tightly pawnshops
are regulated.
The foregoing discussion dealt only with the competition between
consumer finance companies and pawnshops. However, there are numer-
ous other sources of consumer credit, for example, banks, credit unions,
and retail installment sales financing. In most states, each class of credi-
tor operates under different rules and regulations, and each serves a dis-
tinct group of borrowers. 76 Because the different financial institutions do
not operate under uniform laws, competition is distorted. Each lender
exploits its own comparative advantage: banks offer low interest loans to
low risk borrowers, consumer finance companies offer otherwise unavail-
able loans to high risk borrowers, and merchants finance their sales of
73. Id.
74. U.S. DEP'T oF CoM., supra note 69, at 516 (between 1960 and 1979 the market interest rate
rose from 4.82% to 12.67%); Bank, supra note 59.
75. Greer, supra note 73, at 97-98. Under tight regulation, very slow economic growth will
result in a high number of rejections, a moderate growth rate will decrease rejections, but an explo-
sively fast growth rate will again increase rejection rates because lenders will reach a liquidity crisis
and be unable to meet the demand. Id.
76. Florida, for example, authorizes a rate of 30% on that part of the principal not excceding
$500 for consumer finance loans, FLA. STAT. § 516.031(1) (Supp. 1988); yet bank loans not in excess
of $50,000 are only allowed to charge a rate of 18% (but this may be discounted and additional
charges are authorized) FLA. STAT. § 658.49(1) (1987), and retail installment sales are limited to $12
per $100 per year plus additional charges. Id. § 520.34(6)(a).
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goods to both groups of borrowers. The analysis of the resulting rejection
pools becomes more difficult and the consumer understandably becomes
more confused." The morass of consumer credit legislation compounded
by state variations on the theme has sparked a movement for uniformity
of regulation.
B. Legislative Schemes
1. Uniform Consumer Credit Code. The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (UCCC), released in 1968, was one of the most comprehen-
sive steps toward uniformity of regulations governing consumer lending.
The UCCC was formulated largely by representatives of the credit indus-
try and was patterned after the Uniform Commercial Code. In general,
consumer groups opposed the UCCC as being excessively complicated
and too pro-creditor in orientation. This dissension occasioned a total of
five drafts of the UCCC. From 1969 to 1975, many states considered the
UCCC in its various drafts; at least ten states adopted the UCCC and
many more were influenced by it.78
The purpose of the UCCC is to "abolish the crazy-quilt, patchwork
welter of prior laws on consumer credit and replace them [sic] by a single
new comprehensive law.... ."" Under the UCCC, all creditors in a state
are regulated by the same statute, and any variation is based on func-
tional differences, not on type distinctions.8" The UCCC applies to all
consumer credit transactions, whether cash or sale, unless there is a spe-
cific exclusion.81
There is a limited pawnbroker exemption in the UCCC that has gen-
erated some discussion. Except with respect to disclosure requirements,
the UCCC does not apply to "pawnbrokers who are licensed, and whose
rates and charges are regulated under or pursuant to ordinances or other
statutes."82 The official comment interprets this language as excluding
77. See generally, J. CHAPMAN & R. SHAY, supra note 64, at 14-15.
78. The states which have adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code are as follows: Colo-
rado: Ch. 207, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 770; Idaho: Ch. 299, 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws 1116; Ohio: Ch.
119, 1983 Ohio Sess. Laws 264; Indiana: P.L. 366, 1971 Ind. Acts 1557; Iowa: Ch. 1250, 1974 Iowa
Acts 879; Kansas: Ch. 85, 1973 Kan. Sess. Laws 300; Maine: Ch. 762, 1974 Me. Laws 74;
Oklahoma: Ch. 352, 1969 Okla. Sess. Laws 533; South Carolina: Act 1241, 1974 S.C. Acts 2879;
Utah: Ch. 18, 1969 Utah Laws 77; Wyoming: Ch. 191, 1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws 274. See 1 Consumer
Cred. Guide (CCH) 5305 (June 18, 1985).
79. UNIP. CON. CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note 7A U.L.A. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
U.C.C.C.].
80. Id.
81. Id. § 1.201.
82. Id. § 1.202(5).
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pawnbrokers "from coverage of the Act, except for certain disclosure re-
quirements, if local or state laws provide for licensing and regulation of
rates and charges.' 8 3 It is clear that any expressly stated interest ceiling
applicable to pawnbrokers will prevail over UCCC provisions. This is
significant in that the UCCC establishes reasonably high maximum fi-
nance charges-18 percent per annum for unsupervised lenddrs, 84 and 36
percent per annum for that part of the principal amounting to $300 or
less for supervised lenders. 5 Yet the UCCC drafters saw the possible
need to allow pawnbrokers to charge even higher rates, presumably to
further the UCCC goal of assuring "an adequate supply of credit to
consumers."
86
The UCCC scheme raises a few unanswered questions. In jurisdic-
tions that have no laws controlling pawnshops, to what extent does the
UCCC apply? Because the UCCC language expressly excludes pawnbro-
kers who are licensed, and whose rates are regulated elsewhere,87 there is
an implication that if there are no state or local license and rate regula-
tions, then pawnbrokers are subject to the UCCC provisions and the
UCCC rate limitations would apply. Furthermore, it can be argued that
in such situations the UCCC in its entirety would apply to pawnbroker
transactions, including, for example, the UCCC regulations on delin-
quency fees88 and deferral charge limitations.8 9
On the other hand, if pawnbrokers are excluded due to local licens-
ing and rate regulation, to what extent are they exempt from the provi-
sions of the UCCC? At least one interpretation of the UCCC is that
pawnbrokers are only exempt from the UCCC rate regulations, and that
the UCCC would provide the supplemental terms where local laws are
silent.9" However, this interpretation conflicts with the official commen-
tary which interprets pawnbrokers as being excluded from "the Act, ex-
cept for certain disclosure requirements, if local or state laws provide for
licensing and regulation of rates and charges."9 1 One reason for the lack
83. Id. and Official Comment (emphasis added).
84. Id. § 2.401(1).
85. Id. § 2.401(2). A "supervised lender" is "a person authorized to make or take assignments
of supervised loans, under a license issued by the Administrator (§ 2.301) or as a supervised financial
organization (subsection (41)). Id. § 1.301(42).
86. Id. § 1.102(2).
87. Id. § 1.205(5).
88. Id. § 2.502.
89. Id. § 2.503.
90. Miller, The Perplexing Status of Pawnbrokers Under the UCCC, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 121, 123,
126 (1971).
91. U.C.C.C. § 1.202 and Official Comment (1974).
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of clarification on this point may be that most jurisdictions were thought
to have pawnbroker legislation which would qualify for exemption under
the UCCC.92
2. National Consumer Act. In response to the perceived pro-credi-
tor stance of the UCCC, the National Consumer Law Center promul-
gated a pro-consumer uniform credit model-the National Consumer
Act (NCA). In contrast with the UCCC, the NCA does not contain
pawnbroker exclusions. In the absence of an explicit exclusion, and be-
cause the broad scope of consumer transactions within its jurisdiction
was to be liberally construed, 93 it would be difficult to argue that pawn-
brokers are exempted from the NCA regulations. However, because of
the limited acceptance of the NCA, it is pointless to develop this issue.
Only Wisconsin has substantially adopted the NCA,94 and its legislation
expressly excludes pawnbrokers. 95
C. Truth In Lending Act
Probably the most significant federal consumer credit legislation has
been the Truth In Lending Act (TIL),96 which was adopted by Congress
in 1968 as part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The purpose of
the TIL is to provide meaningful disclosure of credit terms and to pro-
mote the informed use of credit in consumer credit transactions.97
Whether the TIL and its implementing rules, Regulation Z,98 apply to all
pawnbrokers is an unsettled issue. The TIL disclosure provisions apply
to any individual in business who regularly extends credit to consumers
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and where the
credit extended is subject to a finance charge, or pursuant to a written
agreement, is payable in more than four installments.99 It is generally
conceded that pawn loan transactions meet the TIL definitions and are
subject to the disclosure provisions. 1°°
What of pawn buy-sell agreements? The Official Commentary pro-
92. All States but Iowa and West Virginia have enacted legislation regulating some aspect(s) of
pawnbroking. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-01(26) (1985) (gives municipality power to license, regu-
late, remove, suppress and prohibit pawnbrokers).
93. NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT § 1.102 (First Final Draft 1970).
94. See Wis. STAT. §§ 421-427 (1986), entitled the Wisconsin Consumer Act.
95. Id. §§ 421.202(4).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1982 & Supp. 1989).
97. Id.
98. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-226.24 (1988).
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(f), (h) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(c) (1988).
100. U.C.C.C. § 1.202(5) Official Comment (1974).
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vides no answers to this question. However, in response to inquiries, the
Federal Reserve issued the following advisory letters:
Pawnbrokers. -[T]he finance charge is to be computed... [by] the length
of time a pawnbroker is required by law to hold an article before it may be
sold, or the period of time agreed to by the parties, whichever is longer. If
there is no statutory minimum period and the pawnbroker may sell the
article at any time, then for the purpose of computing the finance charge,
the period shall be that period of time agreed to by the parties or one
month, whichever is longer.101
[Where a] customer has the right to repurchase the item sold within 30
days, presumably at an elevated price .... [t]he pawnbroker is subject to
Regulation Z (12 CFR 226) if the initial purchase price of the item is below
its current market value at the time of the purchase. If this is true and the
redemption price exceeds the initial purchase price, the pawnbroker should
make the disclosures, as applicable, under Section 226.8 of the Regula-
tion.10 2 Among these would be the "amount financed" (pawnbroker's ini-
tial purchase price), the payment schedule, the security interest, the
"finance charge," and the "annual percentage rate."
The 'finance charge . . . would be the difference between the pawn-
broker's purchase price and the redemption price. Since the redemption pe-
riod is one month, the "annual percentage rate" would be computed as a
single payment, single advance transaction by multiplying the finance
charge per $100 of amount financed (found by dividing the finance charge
by the amount financed and multiplying by 100) by 12. There is no require-
ment that you compute or state an annual percentage rate if [the] finance
charge falls within certain limits relative to the amount financed (Section
226.8(b)(2)). 103
After these letters were released, it appeared that all pawn transac-
tions were governed by the TIL disclosure provisions, regardless of
whether the transaction was characterized as a loan or a buy-sell argu-
ment. Then, as a result of allegations that it was too complex to be useful,
the TIL was rewritten and the changes were adopted in 1980 as the The
Truth in Lending Simplification Reform Act. A revised Regulation Z
and Official Commentary were issued to include and supersede interpre-
tations of the original Act. Again, the issue of pawn transactions was not
addressed. In response to a telephone interview regarding the effects of
101. BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, PUBLIC POSITION LETTER
No. 419, II TRUTH IN LENDING MANUAL D-156 (4th ed. 1976).
102. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (1988) (establishes the disclosure criteria for identification of transfers).
103. BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, PUBLIC POSITION LETTER
No. 119 II TRUTH IN LENDING MANUAL 0-41 (4th ed. 1976). 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b) (1988) (sets
forth the requirements for disclosure in nonsale credit transactions). Nonsale credit is any form of
loan credit, including cash advances, in which the creditor is not selling property to the debtor. See
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(16) (1988).
[Vol. 37
PAWNBROKING ON PARADE
these revisions, a staff member of the Federal Trade Commission, the
primary enforcement agency, stated that pawn transactions generally are
excluded from the Act."° The staff member cautioned that whether a
particular pawn transaction is excluded depends on the facts and the cir-
cumstances surrounding the transaction, and must be determined on a
case by case basis.105
In summation, the last few decades have brought pawnshops to the
verge of ruin. Archaic, unreasonably low interest rate ceilings, bur-
geoning credit availability, diverse consumer credit options, credit cards,
and skyrocketing inflation rates have all contributed to the decline. Yet,
the public policy reflected in legislation such as the UCCC indicates that
there is still recognition, as there has been for hundreds of years, that
pawnbrokers fill an economic and social void, and thus should be pre-
served, if not encouraged.
IV. THE RIGHT DEGREE OF REGULATORY RIGOR
If you would know the value of money, go try to borrow some.
-Benjamin Franklin
A. Introduction
Credit in any form is an apt subject for regulation. This is true even
though we have progressed from a time when consumer debtors were
scorned for being so improvident as to need to borrow money, to an era
in which creditworthiness is the mark of a solid citizen. Many credit reg-
ulations can be dismissed as being essentially structural or procedural;
they establish the formalities of the trade. Examples would be licensing,
posting bonds, carrying insurance, providing receipts, redemption peri-
ods, sale procedures, and annual inspections. 106 Others are explainable in
terms of protecting the public- order, such as those regulating police reg-
isters, hours during which business can be conducted, transactions with
minors, and fingerprinting of pledgers."°7
The regulations that are the most difficult to explain are those that
104. FLA. S. COM. COM'N, 1984-85 INTERIM REPORT 30 (Jan. 1985).
105. Id.
106. See, eg., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 21200-21209 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 12-56-101, 104 (1986 & Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. §§ 715.04-715.042 (1987 & Supp. 1988). To the
extent that these "procedural" and "protective of the public order" rules are barriers to entry into
the credit markets or otherwise create an anticompetitive atmosphere, they may create a situation
where price regulation seems desirable.
107. Id.
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deal with price, for in most other sectors of our economy we reject price
controls.108 Early arguments in favor of price controls were based on
both moral and religious grounds, and on the general theory that capital
is nonproductive. 109 Modem justifications for price controls on the cost
of borrowing focus on concepts such as "fairness," "conscionability,"
"bargaining disparity," or "adhesion contracts," and fail to give due re-
gard either to the costs of providing credit, or to the observation that
restrictive limitations on the rate charged can have the effect of limiting
the availability of that type of credit."' The literature is replete with
statements such as the following:
It must become obvious to the public, as it is already well known to the
social worker, that the borrower of small loans is well high helpless as a
bargainer. His need is urgent. It cannot wait. He has no way meeting it out
of his own resources. He must have credit or he must seek charity. Except
for the crisis in which he finds himself, he can get along. The obvious an-
swer to his problem is credit. But he has no material assets with which to
guarantee his repayment of a loan. He is helpless in the hands of the un-
scrupulous, unless society will stand at his shoulder and see justice done.I 1
When the rates set out in the Uniform Small Loan Act were being dis-
cussed the following statement was made: "It is also to be remembered
that he [the person who would borrow money at these higher rates] is the
man who can least afford to pay .... ,12 Or the issue can be raised as a
question of morals as was well articulated by State Senator Paul Douglas
in testimony before the Massachusetts legislature: "At what point does a
rate become so high that society expresses the judgment that it is uncon-
scionable and that the individual must do without the credit rather than
pay the unconscionably high rates?" '113
Modem "free market" scholars may well suggest that it would be
unwise to set any upper limit. However, even if it could be agreed that,
regardless of the economic consequences, beyond some point a rate of
interest is "unconscionable," much debate would be needed to determine
108. J. CHAPMAN & R. SHAY, supra note 64, at 139.
109. See Historical Perspective, Section II, infra.
110. Greer, supra note 73, at 95-101.
111. R. KELSO, SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE SMALL LOAN BUSINSS IN THE UNITED STATES
21-22 (1948). For example, consumer finance companies have learned that a majority of their cus-
tomers need credit counseling to obtain information and solve their problems. J. CHAPMAN & R.
SHAY, supra note 64, at 18 n.27.
112. McReynolds, supra note 66, at 299.
113. Statement of Senator Paul H. Douglas before the Legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, January 29, 1969.
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the magic tipping point. Early in our history, the "six percent myth" '114
would have suggested that figure as a proper target. Not surprisingly,
attempts to set realistic limits on the maximum rate of interest that can
be charged run into severe criticism:
The most unbelievable part of this whole story is the fact that the Russell
Sage Foundation was able to sell many legislatures in the United States an
interest rate of three and one-half percent per month, or forty-two percent
per annum, as a reasonable rate of interest. The only explanation which can
be given for that salesmanship is that the proposal came from a charitable
trust and was offered as the solution for a sociological problem.... If the
rate of interest proposed had been suggested without "benefit of clergy" to-
wit, the charitable front, it would not have been entertained for a single
moment by any legislature .... As one writer put it, "It was from social
agencies that the small loan companies learned the trick of immunity by
legislating unconscionable rates under the guise of serving the forgotten
man, the necessitous borrower." 115
"I also believe an interest rate ceiling of 42 percent on credit trans-
actions under $300 is entirely too high and borders on the unconsciona-
ble."' 16 When discussing the rate ceilings of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, it was suggested that: "To give persons a right to charge 36
percent plus interest (or finance charge) shocks at least my conscience
and I do not believe that I am unduly sensitive.""' 7
Some price regulation might be justified. Two possible economic ra-
tionales for controls on the price of credit are that the "credit market is
so imperfect that consumers seldom pay a 'fair' price for their use of
credit," and that "within each given credit market, suppliers of credit
may have a monopoly power, so that even with perfect knowledge con-
sumers may be overcharged for their use of credit.""'
The most troublesome market imperfection would seem to be that
many consumers do not perceive that they can effectively shop for credit.
This misperception is based on ignorance regarding the variety of alter-
natives, including not only other pawnshops where the rate would be
lower and the terms less onerous, but also alternatives for credit that
114. Influenced by English law, many of the colonies in the early 18th century established a
lawful rate of 6%. Thus arose a prevailing view that 6% was a proper rate. S. HOMER, supra note 41,
at 274-75.
115. McReynolds, supra note 66, at 295-96.
116. Separate Statement of Senator William Proxmire in CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES 221 (1972).
117. Comment by the Honorable George Brun, a Berkeley, California municipal court judge, as
quoted in A Consumer Credit Code... for lenders, 1969 CONSUMER REP. 131.
118. Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MICH. L.
REV. 81, 90 (1967).
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would approximate the ease and convenience with which money can be
obtained from pawnshops. This market imperfection-the imperfection
of impulsivity-seems to be little affected by disclosure provisions." 9
Disclosure might raise the consciousness of the debtor, and the informa-
tion gained may discourage the borrower; however, studies generally
have indicated that consumers have a high degree of insenitivity to the
level of credit charges.120 Urgency and shame diminish the rationality of
"economic" activity, somewhat as grief and surprise distort the market
for funeral services.
Another market imperfection is the tendency of each segment of the
credit granting market to be monopolistic. For the person seeking to
pawn his goods, there is no national market, no state market, and, as a
practical matter, probably no market out of his neighborhood."' Thus,
the local pawnshop has little or no incentive to engage in price self-con-
trol. This is especially the case when the pawner is a relatively poor
credit risk; for him there are few other sources of credit. Similar symp-
toms can be found in those jurisdictions where the legislature has set a
maximum rate for the creditor; usually credit grantors will charge the
maximum rate. 122
An additional, underlying problem with the consumer credit system
that defies workable regulation is that of oversupply or over-extension of
119. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693(r) (1982).
120. See, e.g., Juster, Consumer Sensitivity to the Price of Credit, 19 J. FINANCE 222 (1964)
White & Munger, Consumer Sensitivity to Interest Rates: An Empirical Study of the New Car Buyers
and Auto Loans, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1222 (1971). ("Is it not remarkable that a majority of the
new car buyers [in the author's sample] have [sic] been paying 25% more interest than they had to
pay?"). See also NATIONAL COMMISION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER AWARENESS OF
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES OF CHARGE IN CONSUMER INSTALLNENT CREDIT: BEFORE AND
AFTER TRUTH IN LENDING BECAME EFFECTIVE, (1972). The study concludes that credit cost and
disclosure are not determinating factors on most credit transactions. Id. at 100-03.
121. "The inadequacy of competition in the inner city marketplace is well known." Johnson,
Rate Competition, 26 Bus. LAW 777, 780 (1971).
122. Statement of the Consumer Federation of America on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
before the Virginia Consumer Credit Study Commission, May 24, 1971, at 5:
It is common knowledge, especially in disadvantaged areas where there is such a dispar-
ity of economic strength, that legal maximums quickly become the accepted norm. Once
those rates are cloaked with the legitimacy of law, no creditor or seller will hesitate to
impose the maximum whether warranted by competitive economic conditions or not.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CREDIT CODE ADVISORY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON JUDICIARY OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE 1972, at 305 (statement of Richard A. Elbrecht). This
is generally thought to be a rationing problem and not one of pricing. See infra note 209 and accom-
panying text.
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credit.123 In many situations, borrowers have more obligations than they
can afford. This problem would seem to be less critical in the case of
pawnshops because if the payment is not made, there is no harassment of
the debtors, no lawsuits, no loss of worktime due to court appearances,
and no bad credit reports. There could be psychological or practical
problems if the item pawned was necessary for continued employment,
for example, a musician's horn or a mason's trowel, or if the pawned item
was something of importance to a relationship, such as an engagement
ring, or essential for family comfort, like the television or the electric
heater. Problems of financial mismanagement are not isolated occur-
rences; in a study conducted by Stanley and Girth in the early 1970s, it
was found that poor debt management was the leading single reason for
personal bankruptcy.124
If the rate charged by pawnbrokers is to be regulated, it is wise to
pause to consider who will be protected and who will be disadvantaged.
It is clear that those who have numerous, available avenues of credit will
not be disadvantaged. But what of those who regularly use pawnshops
for perceived needs or wants? If these individuals have no other legiti-
mate sources of liquidity, and they probably do not, they will be denied
access to the desired credit if rates are set so low that pawnshops can no
longer profitably operate. These "needs and wants" will not easily be leg-
islated away. Furthermore, it is in such an atmosphere that loan sharks
flourish. 1
25
Even if the rates are set high enough for the pawnshops to survive
but not thrive, it is reasonable to assume that pawnbrokers will tend to
123. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES 99-102 (1972).
124. In a survey to determine the causes of personal bankruptcy and the underlying financial
difficulty,
[t]he leading reason, given by 31%, was poor debt management-too many debts, un-
wise refinancing, overspending. Their decisions about borrowing or buying depended
only on whether or not they thought their current income could support another
monthly payment. All too seldom did they evaluate the total cost involved or their fu-
ture prospects.
Next as underlying causes were family health reasons (sickness, injuries, babies,
death), 28%, and job problems like layoffs, strikes, and loss of overtime, 20%. Then
13% cited threats of legal action or hounding by creditors, followed by 10% who men-
tioned actual legal action-suit, garnishment, repossession.
D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS REFORM 47 (1971). See also, J.
CHAPMAN & R, SHAY, supra note 64, at 25-27.
125. "History is replete with cases where loan sharks have lobbied in legislatures for unrealistic
minimum rates, knowing that such meaningless ceilings would permit them to charge much higher
rates." Statement by Dr. Paul A. Samuelson before the Committee on the Judiciary of the General
Court of Massachusetts in Support of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, January 29, 1969.
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reduce the amount that they would otherwise be willing to loan on a
given item of property. This would have a dual result: (1) for each failure
to redeem, the pawnbroker would have a lower basis in the item and
would thus be able to achieve a larger profit margin on resale; and, (2)
those persons unable to redeem would lose proportionally more than
those who are able to redeem. Thus, some of the costs of the pawnbrok-
ing system that would be borne equally by all borrowers, regardless of
whether they were able to redeem, would be shifted to those who would
be unable to redeem. 126 Overall, the uncontrolled variable, that is, the
appraisal of loan value, should come into equilibrium with the regulated
variable, the rate of interest, to yield a return commensurate with risk
and cost of money-the rate of return (or interest) that escapes regula-
tion. Under such a scheme, those persons "who can least afford it" are
carrying a proportionally higher percentage of the industry costs. An-
other side effect is that if the loan amount, plus pawn-value ratio is low,
the consumer must commit a larger proportion of her property in order
to obtain a given amount of credit.
Rate regulation is not the only way to regulate the number of pawn-
shops. Barriers to entry into the marketplace also have dramatic impact
on the availability of credit; the tight regulation of credit significantly
reduces credit availability. 127 Some types of regulation restrict entry
overtly, such as limiting the number of pawnshops, and requiring expen-
sive bonds or state licenses. 128 Other restrictions affect entry more subtly
by increasing the cost of doing business to the extent that only those who
have access to large amounts of operating capital can enter the market-
place. 129 Examples of these latter restrictions include lengthy redemption
periods, elaborate sales procedures, the requirement of maintaining sur-
plus refunds, and regulations limiting business hours.130 Because the sup-
126. There is little available information on forfeiture rates. Oregon reports forfeiture rates of
approximately 16% and Indiana reports 14%. See Ind. Rep. and Or. Rep., supra note 8. In another
example, one pawnbroker reports forfeiture rates varying from 20% (guns) to 70% (tape decks and
stereos). Tarnowski, supra note 8, at 67:V14, 67:D1.
127. Greer, supra note 73, at 101.
128. See, eg., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 446.202 (West or Callaghan 1986) ($3,000 bond);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 41 (McKinney 1988) ($10,000 bond); OR. REV. STAT § 726.070 (1987)
($25,000 bond).
129. To establish a new pawn business requires at least $200,000 working capital for the first
year. Tarnowski, supra note 8, at 67:C14, 67:D1.
130. See, eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, 1 4660 (1988) (redemption period one year from date of
default); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1758 (West 1988) (12 month redemption period for jewelry);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:22-25 (1986 & Supp.1989) (redemption period of 12 months from date of
loan).
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ply of pawnshops is a reaction to the effects of both rate ceilings and
barriers to entry, any legislative regulation must take both of these eco-
nomic forces into account.
Another form of regulation, namely that of "police regulations,"
also increases the cost of pawnbroker operations. As was earlier indi-
cated, pawnshops can be used for furthering illegal purposes; they are
natural clearinghouses for the fencing operations of organized and unor-
ganized crime alike.131 This "attribute" led to the enactment of police
regulations in virtually every state. 132 These regulations appear to work.
Professional thieves, knowing that pawnshops must report the receipt of
goods to the police, will fence elsewhere. Likewise, there is little incentive
for pawnbrokers to buy "hot" items;133 they may risk prosecution, loss of
license, or at least loss of the loan proceeds plus the pawn if the property
is impounded, and ultimately returned to its rightful owner. 134 There
seems to be little opposition to workable and reasonable restrictions on
the ability of pawnshops to serve as fencing operations, and any scheme
to regulate pawnbrokers should include such provisions.
When considering the benefits and drawbacks of various forms of
pawnshop interest rate regulations, it will be helpful to group the propos-
als into various discussion models: (1) disorganized reaction, an invita-
tion to loansharking; (2) free market; (3) public utility; and (4)
compromise, including an unconscionability proposal.'35
B. Models for Rate Control
1. Disorganized Reaction, An Invitation to Loansharking. The dis-
organized reaction model would include, build upon, and hopefully im-
prove the current hodgepodge of regulatory schemes now in place in
numerous jurisdictions. To aid in this venture, many legislatures conduct
cyclical reviews of all regulatory schemes, including those of the pawn-
shop industry; new regulations are imposed and extant ones are pragmat-
131. Note, Pawnbroker Regulation and the Pennsylvania Act, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 104 (1940).
132. See, ag., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1621 B, 1622 (1987); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 21202,
21208 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989); FLA STAT. § 715.041(1) (Supp. 1989); IND. CODE § 28-7-5-6
(1986); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 43. 55 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 91-4 (1988); 63 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 281-10, 11-13 (Purdon 1986); 14D TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-51.09(a)
(Vernon 1986).
133. One pawnbroker estimates one item out of every 1,000 is stolen; another reports that the
police are "death on hot goods." Pawnshops: Quick Money at High Cost, 36 CHANGING TIMES 88, 90
(1982).
134. Id.
135. This basic scheme of analysis was "borrowed" from an earlier article devoted to the general
question of usury limitations. See Oeltjen, supra note 15, at 226-34.
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ically examined. 136 Indeed, as regulatory legislation is enacted, the
legislation is scheduled for review and reenactment within a certain time
limit. If no action is taken, the statute expires. This "sunset" program
ensures a periodic and systematic review of the effectiveness or economic
efficiency of the regulation.
The regulatory extreme of this first model may already be found in
crude form in those jurisdictions which severely limit the profitability or
the entry into the market of new pawnbrokers. 137 The New York experi-
ence is probably the classic example of legislating pawnshops out of exist-
ence. Pawnbrokers, limited to charges of 30 percent annually for loans
not exceeding $100 and 18 percent annually for loans in excess of $100,
labored under requirements such as a one-year redemption period, the
mailing of a notice ten days prior to sale, the publishing of a notice six
days prior to sale, sale by public auction only, and the holding of sale
surplus for one year to allow the ticket holder to reclaim. 138 The number
of licensed pawnbrokers in New York City tumbled from 130 in 1950 to
35 in 1975.139 The miracle is that between the fixed rate ceiling, and the
high costs of capital in the 1970's, any pawnshops survived at all.
Although hard data is understandably absent, it seems resonable to as-
sume that the economic void thus created was partially filled by loan
sharks.
Many of the attributes of pawnbrokers and loan sharks are similar.
Both offer relatively easy, informal access to capital. The speed, conven-
ience, availability, and secrecy that both offer are also comparable. How-
ever, the social costs of loan-sharking are high."4 For example, there are
no effective limits on lender practices, the absence of which results in
exorbitant interest rates for those borrowers with high demands for
money and no available, legitimate source of credit. Also, because the
goal of loan-sharking is to maximize profits, there is incentive to generate
136. See, eg., FLA. STAT. § 11.61(5) (1985) which mandates a review within 10 years after the
effective date of the act creating the regulatory function.
137. For an example of price restrictions, see Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-67-21 (1988) (which limits
interest to 10% annually). Examples of non-price restrictions include; N.Y. GEN. Bus, LAW § 48
(McKinney 1988) (both mailed and publication of notice, and sale by public auction only); OR. REV.
STAT. § 726.070 (1983) (bond requirement of $25,000). Some states require that any surplus be
turned over to the pledger on demand. See, eg., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 446.212 (1986); 63 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 281-26, 27 (Purdon 1986 & Supp.1989); WiS. STAT. § § 138.10 (11), (12) (1989).
138. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 46 (McKinney 1988).
139. Near the mid 1970's, one pawnbroker reported a profit margin of only 4% on loans exceed-
ing $100. P. SCHWED, supra note 4, at 196-97.
140. For a thorough discussion of the loan-sharking industry, see Oeltjen, supra note 15, at 217-
21 and the authorities cited therein.
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additional interest by discouraging repayment of the principal. Lastly,
loan-sharking may lead to increased criminal activity: necessitous bor-
rowers, driven by fear of reprisals in the form of physical violence, or by
the expected need for future services, may commit crimes in order to
repay the loan shark.
Loan-sharking is illegal under both federal"' and state law.142 Yet,
whenever the law sets a maximum loan charge rate, a minimum risk ac-
ceptance level is thereby established. The high risk rejections provide the
market for loan sharks.1 43 It is clear that excessively restrictive interest
rate ceilings would create an atmosphere conducive to the loan shark
business. However, even with general rate ceilings at restrictive levels,
pawnshops can offer an economic substitute. Thus, to foster or to main-
tain restrictive legislation on pawnshops appears to reflect a policy "non-
decision" to create an atmosphere where loan sharks could flourish by
serving high risk borrowers. 1"
If a detailed regulatory scheme is desired, a limited purpose, a Uni-
form Act proposal such as the Uniform Small Loan Act would seem
ideal. The drafting of such a proposal would necessarily begin with an
141. The Consumer Credit Protection Act, recognizing the problem involved in extortionate
extensions of credit, states:
An extortionate extention of credit is any extension of credit with respect to which it is
the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time it is made that delay in
making repayment or failure to make repayment could result in the use of violence or
other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person.
18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1987). Such an extortionate extension of credit can be punished by fines of up to
$10,000 or a maximum of 20 years imprisonment or both. Id. § 892(a). These federal provisions do
not preempt similar state laws. Id. § 896.
142. In 1969, for example, Florida adopted similar statutory procedures. See FLA. STAT.
§ 687.071 (1985). In addition to outlawing criminal usury by making the charging of interest of less
than 45%, but more than 25% a misdemeanor of the second degree, and the charging of 45% and
more a third degree felony, Florida also prohibits extortionate extensions of credit. Anyone who
makes such an extension, or conspires to do so, can be charged with a felony of the third degree. Id.
§§ 687.071(2), (3), (4). No extension of credit made in violation of these provisions is an enforceable
debt in Florida courts. Id. § 687.071 (7). Also, Florida adopted the Florida Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) in 1977. Id. §§ 895.01-.09. This racketeering act is patterned
after the Federal RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1982), but is broader in scope. The Florida
RICO act can be triggered by criminal or civil violations, including extensions of usurious loans
under Ch. 687. FLA. STAT. §§ 895.02(1)(a)8, (2)(a)3 (1985). For an excellent discussion, see Maguire
Racketeers and Non-Racketeers Alike Should Fear Florida's RICO Act, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 483
(1978).
143. Loan costs tend to follow rate ceilings, not vice versa; therefore, the lower the rate ceiling,
the lower the risk acceptance. Greer, supra note 73, at 143-44.
144. In 1980, to encourage pawnbroker business, New York passed legislation to raise applica-
ble interest ceilings. Ch. 790, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1935.
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examination of the array of regulations now in place.1 45 It might end
with a comprehensive body of rules that is easily discernible and accessi-
ble. Standardization would be helpful not only to the regulators and
those regulated, but also to researchers who could then test the various
assumptions on which the uniform provisions were based. 146 The avail-
able data on pawnshop operations is quite limited. For instance, in 1986
only two states, Oregon and Indiana, had collected sufficient information
to present a meaningful profile of pawnbroker operations. 147
One of the main problems with this model is that studies of both
rates, and actual and potential returns may show that the ideal rate
should be in excess of 100 percent simple interest. Considering the lobby-
ing efforts by other financial institutions arguing for parity, as well as the
possibility of adverse publicity in an election year, such a proposal would
stand little chance of success.
2. Free Market System
I know of no economist of any standing... who has favored a legal
limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive-
though there must have been some. 148
The regulatory schemes in jurisdictions such as Florida and Utah 149
are unique in their simplicity; such free market examples nearly eliminate
the costly process of regulation and minimize impediments to entry of
new pawnbrokers into the market.
Textbook theory tells us that a laissez-faire approach toward rates of
interest would yield many benefits. For example, if the margin between
the interest component of the service charge that the pawnbroker levies
and his own cost of money narrows, business would no longer be suffi-
ciently profitable, and pawnbrokers would leave the market. If the spread
expands, business would become increasingly profitable, and new pawn-
brokers would enter the market. Market forces, not government control,
would maintain the correct rate of interest. Debtors would be responsive
145. See, eg., IND. CODE §§ 28-7-5-1 to 28-7-5-37 (1986); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 140, §§ 70-85
(1986 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § § 41-55 (McKinney 1988).
146. For example, a study may show that, "Now, after 5 years of experience with the new
uniform act, our studies show that only the poor and least credit worthy frequent this enterprise,
whereas before uniformity, pawnshops were becoming a source of quick bucks for a segment of the
middle class as well." (Some pawnshops are currently reporting a trend of more affluent clientele,
i.e., doctors, lawyers, accountants, and executives.) Russell, Merchandise, Patrons Change at Pawn-
shops, BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Jan. 7, 1982, at 7:B5.
147. See Ind. Rep. and Or. Rep., supra note 7.
148. Friedman, In Defense of Usury, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1970, at 79.
149. FLA. STAT. §§ 715.04-.042 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 11-6 to 11-64 (1986).
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to price: when the interest is high, less credit would be purchased; when
the rate is low, more credit would be purchased. To achieve competition,
there must be free access such that no one pawnshop can control the
prices.
One argument against removing rate ceilings is that, since creditors
do not now compete for business, but rather collude to charge the maxi-
mum allowable rate, why would they compete if there were no ceilings?
The short answer is that the lack of competition indicates the ceiling is
too low and thus creditors cannot afford to compete.15 Rate competition
is possible, and it does happen, but only when the market rate is well
below any established ceiling. Now that rate ceilings are not generally
being pushed by the market rate, one only needs to peruse the newspa-
pers to find numerous examples of credit competition, automobile loans,
and home equity loans being prime examples.
Another pertinent question is whether the price of credit actually
does influence the amount of credit purchased. Even though changes in
the interest rate may significantly affect the supply of credit, 151 studies
150. The New York pawnbroker situation previously discussed seems to bear this out; when the
rate is set so low that a pawnshop cannot even stay in business, any discussion of lowering charges to
compete seems a moot point. Further support is found in data showing that before the mid 1970's
credit squeeze, credit was not at the ceiling, i.e., the prevailing rate was not the maximum rate. See
Oeltjen, supra note 15, at 224.
151. [E]ffect of the rate of interest on thesupply of funds... rather than on the demand...
implies that changes in the rate of interest will not affect the demand for funds as much
as the supply, and that lenders will have to use other methods, i.e., credit rationing, to
cope with the excess demand.
Catt, "Credit Rationing" and the Keynesian Model, 75 ECON. J. 358 (1965). The author goes on to
explain why this "is not merely a frictional imperfection of the money market but is a chronic
condition arising out of the essentially rational behavior of lenders, especially the larger institutions
who lead the market." Id.
"[Many] legislatures have exempted loans to corporation [sic] from the usury statute, no doubt in
partial recognition of the convertibility of the capital market between equity stock and interest bear-
ing investment." Statement of Marion Benefield in South Carolina Committee To Study The Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code and Federal Consumer Protection Act, Report Of Findings 57-58
(Supp. to Journal 16, Jan. 1971). "[Y]ou absolutely cannot make money available at below cost by
passing a law." Id. at 56.
"It was the general opinion of those involved in commercial lending that the ten percent ceiling
had a very restrictive effect on the flow of risk capital into the state and that it was in large measure
responsive for Arkansas' status as a capital-poor state." Comment, An Empirical Study of the Arkan-
sas Usury Law: "With Friends Like That... ", 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 544, 584. "The nationally recog-
nized small loan companies have generally avoided Arkansas because of the unlikelihood of
profitable operation under the ten percent ceiling." Id. at 574. But cf Separate Statement of Con-
gresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 238 (1972) ("[I]n a
period of tight money, unrestricted rates from business credit siphon off vast amounts of money from
housing and from other essential purposes. I do not subscribe to the philosophy that we should
permit investment funds, willy-nilly, to go to those credit purposes which bring the highest return.").
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indicate that the demand for credit is relatively inelastic;"5 2 and none of
these studies focus on the special market of pawnbroker clients which in
all probability would show even more inelasticity. Thus, it is argued, if
inter-pawnshop competition does not hold down the price, "necessitous"
borrowers will nevertheless borrow at exorbitant rates, unmatched by
risk, and lenders will reap vast "unearned" profits. 53 But low-income/
high-risk groups are overwhelmingly in favor of small loan availability
even if the interest rates are excessive by some standards. If indeed this
"legal loan-sharking" brutalizes the poor,'54 those most affected show no
desire for relief.
This model, then, encourages greater access to credit for high risk
borrowers, thereby providing alternatives to dealing with loan sharks;
further, it permits individual choice rather than paternalistic decisions as
to worthiness for credit.
3. Public Utility. To achieve a high degree of control over pawn-
brokers while not legislating them out of business, it may be desirable to
regulate them in a manner similar to the way in which public utilities are
regulated. To do so would be to entitle pawnbrokers to a fair rate of
return on their investment, while insuring that the customers are receiv-
152. See Juster, Consumer Sensitivity of the Price of Credit, 19 J. FINANCE 222 (1964).
Most consumers are in fact unresponsive, but only because they are constrained to ac-
cept shorter contract maturities than they would prefer. By implication, if credit institu-
tions were to offer longer maturities at finance rates commensurate with the added risks,
consumers would become rate sensitive because they would no longer be rationed.... In
short, consumers appear to be unresponsive to finance rates because they do not have
access to anything like a perfectly competitive capital market. The closer capital markets
come to this analytical ideal, the more sensitive will consumers be to the cost of funds.
Id. at 233.
In their econometric studies of consumer sensitivity of finance rates, Juster and Shay found it a
necessity to qualify the widely held view that consumer borrowing decisions are wholly unresponsive
to changes in finance rates, aside from the effect of rate changes on monthly payments. This general-
ization appears to be valid for rationed consumers-those whose preferred and actual debt positions
are different. It is not valid for unrationed consumers-those whose preferred and actual debt posi-
tions are equal. At present the majority of households are probably in the rationed category; hence,
the above generalization may well be valid in the main. The authors then go on to point out that the
percentage of rationed consumers may diminish as lenders continue their extension of debt maturi-
ties, which tends to shift those who are rationed to unrationed status, and that the "secular growth
of incomes and wealth may also mean that the proportion of households in the unrationed classifica-
tion will increase over time. F. JUSTER & R. SHAY, CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO FINANCE RATES.
AN EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION 45-46 (Occasional Paper 88, Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Res. 64).
153. Giles, The Effect of Usury Law on the Credit Market Place, 95 BANKING LJ. 527, 535
(1978).
154. Id. at 536.
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ing reasonable service at the lowest possible cost.' In setting the rates,
the first step would be to determine whether to keep the rate structure
simple or whether to classify pawn transactions, and establish fee sched-
ules that approximate the cost of making loans in each class.
The next step would be to ascertain the costs per typical pawn trans-
action. To determine even the simple, single rate, expenses should in-
lude the cost of the pawn shop's general overhead, the cost of capital
currently loaned out on pawns, and the cost of capital "invested" in the
forfeited but, yet, unsold inventory. Adjustments to operation costs
would have to be made for average surplus generated or for deficiency
occasioned by inventory sales. Once net cost is determined, a fair rate of
return for the pawnshop entrepreneur' 56 would be added. This sum
would be divided by the number of pawners. The resulting figure would
be the service charge per pawn transaction.1 57
If it is decided that a single rate is inappropriate and that charges
ought to vary according to the size of the loan, then to be at all managea-
ble, sizes of loan extensions should probably be grouped, e.g., under $25,
$25 to $50, $50 to $100, $100 to $300, $300 to $1,000, and over $1,000.
The general overhead allocated to each pawn might remain fairly con-
stant except to the extent that the items pawned for a larger extension of
credit may be more expensive to store, to protect, and ultimately to sell
than pawns for relatively small extensions. The costs of capital would be
the greatest and most easily differentiated variable, both for the initial
extension, and for the period between the date of failure to redeem, and
the date of sale.
Another significant variable among classes of pawners, which the
regulators might want to fix for each class (or at least set norms with
155. For example, public utility regulation is to "be in the public interest and this chapter shall
be deemed to be an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public welfare
and all the provisions hereof shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of that purpose."
FLA. STAT. § 366.01 (1985).
156. When computing the rate of return (profit), the regulator would also be able to make the
determination as to whether to make pawnbroking an attractive industry for investment of time and
money and thus to encourage market entry or could provide for very small profit thus discouraging
market entry.
157. To summarize, the formula is:
Total cost (overhead, capital, inventory)
- surpluses (loans repayed, pawns sold)
+ deficiencies (loans defaulted, pawns impounded)
= Net cost
Net Cost + Fair Rate of Return + Contingency Fund
Total number of pawn transactions = Service charge
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permissible variances), would be the percentage difference between the
extension made and the sale price of the unredeemed pawn. For instance,
it may well be that only 40 percent of value would be extended in the
case of a $200 pawn but 65 percent would be extended in the case of a
$5,000 pawn. The ratio of redemptions to extensions for each class would
also be an important factor to consider; for instance, $5,000 items may be
redeemed 90 percent of the time whereas $80 items are only redeemed 30
percent of the time.5 8 Thus, the net cost of each scheduled category of
loan could be determined. To these cost figures a fair return for the
pawnbroker would be added. If a certain class of pawn is to be discour-
aged, a disincentive could be built into the "fair return" structure; for
example, small pawns could be made to generate proportionately less
profit for the pawnshop than larger pawns, or larger pawns could be "ra-
tioned" to require a fixed ratio of "uneconomic" small pawns to large.
This discussion assumes that redemption periods would be the same
for each of the various classes of pawn transactions, and that there would
be no reduction in fees for early payment. If the regulatory scheme in-
cludes varying redemption periods, and discounts for early payment, the
rate setting procedure would be even more complex. 159 This model does
not take into account the possible per pawner cost differences between
large pawnshops and small ones, 160 or possible differences of the various
classes of pawn transactions from one pawnshop to another.
To the extent that the regulations are being established for homoge-
neous locations, pawnshop rates could probably be calculated more eas-
ily than those of many public utilities. 6 ' However, in most jurisdictions
158. Redemption rates vary with types of merchandise and business. Pawnshop owners would
have to be interviewed (audited?) to ascertain regional rates. For example: one pawnbroker reports
redemption rates of 80% for guns, 60%-70% for jewelry, and only 30% for general merchandise
(tape decks and stereos). Tarnowski, supra note 8, at 67:C14, 67:DI. Another report cites redemp-
tion rates as averaging greater than 85%. Warfel, For Pawnshops, a Bad Economy is Good for Busi-
ness, BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, March 29, 1982, at 40:F5.
159. Pennsylvania, for example, sets a 6% annual interest rate cap plus additional fees such as
for storage, varying in amount based on merchandise type and redemption period. 63 PA. CONS,
STAT. § 19-26-18 (Purdon 1986). Other states have no fixed redemption period and contract terms
control. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-56-103 (1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 726.400 (1987); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 45-6-114 (1986); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-51.13 (Vernon 1986).
160. See Oeltjen, supra note 16, at 231 and authorities cited therein. "[S]tudies on efficiency find
few cost differences between large lenders and small lenders-although, to be efficient, offices must
do the amount of business for which they were designed." Id.
161. For example, Florida utility rate regulation is determined as follows:
In fixing the just, reasonable, and compensatory rates, charges, fares, tolls, or rentals to
be observed and charged for service within the state by any and all public utilities under
its jurisdiciton, the commission is authorized to give consideration, among other things,
to the efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of the facilities provided and the services
[Vol. 37
PAWNBROKING ON PARADE
this would not be cost effective regulation; the cost of rate determinations
and enforcement could well exceed the compiled revenue of the industry.
In those jurisdictions that support a large number of pawnshops, this is
still not the theoretical ideal, but it is a more rational approach to rate
regulation than setting a flat, or even a graduated, maximum charge de-
termined on the basis of emotional, paternalistic consumer protection
rhetoric. At least under this model, pawnshops would not be inadver-
tently driven out of business by regulations unrelated to cost. However,
to facilitate this model, a system of detailed reporting or auditing would
have to be established. Few, if any, of the presently existing statutory
schemes would facilitate collection of sufficient information to make such
periodic rate determinations.16
4. Compromise. None of the models yet proposed could be billed
as an ideal solution to the "more or less regulation" debate; though some
of the models would be more politically feasible than others. To find a
compromise, one must construct a legal regime with neither rigid rate
ceilings, nor a totally free market. Two compromise suggestions, dis-
cussed in the order of preference, follow.
The first proposal is for a rateless structure, subject only to market
forces, and a conscionability limitation. The parties would be free to set
the pawn terms, including interest charges; but a court could modify or
void the transaction if the interest rate, or the contract as a whole was
found to be unconscionable. 163
The second model builds on the first. This model has an added fea-
ture of a rebuttable statutory presumption as to where the rate line of
conscience should be drawn.16 This magic line would serve as both
guide and notice: charges over that rate are presumed unconscionable;
charges under that rate are presumed conscionable. Another advantage
rendered; the cost of providing such service and the value of such service to the public;
the ability of the utility to improve such service and facilities....
FLA. STAT. § 366.041(1) (1987).
162. Most pawnshop recording is conducted for police purposes and requires only transaction
dates, identification of the pawner and property. See, eg., ALAsKA STAT. § 08.76.010 (1986); CoLO.
REV. STAT. § 12-56-103 (1986); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 140, § 79 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
163. The concept of unconscionability is by no means new. For approximately twenty-five years,
the Uniform Commercial Code unconscionability section, § 2-302, has been in force in most states
and there is already a significant body of case law defining and applying the concept.
164. See The Money-lenders Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 51, which declares unconscionable
charges to be illegal and sets the presumption level at 48 percent. Charges over this figure are rebut-
tably unconscionable; charges under this level are rebuttably conscionable. See also The Money-
lenders Act of 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 21; Oeltjen, supra note 15, at 232; Lord Meston, Rates of
Interest in Moneylending Transactions, I SOLIC. Q. 40, 40-46 (1962).
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of adding a presumption would be to allocate the burden of proof of
conscionability or unconscionability. If the interest charged is less than
the standard, the burden would be on the pawner to prove the charge
excessive. If the rate exceeds the standard, the pawnbroker would have
the burden of proving that the rate is not excessive. A pawnbroker might
establish that a charge in excess of this guideline was reasonable by prov-
ing exceptional risk, such as past credit experience or cost surrounding
the loan.
C. Non Rate Factors6 '
In those jurisdictions that have either fairly high limits, or no legis-
lative limit 66 on the interest rates that can be charged by pawnbrokers,
most non-rate regulatory factors will have very little direct effect on the
availability of pawnshop credit. To the extent that the regulations in-
crease the cost of business, the costs will be passed on to the borrowers.
As we have seen, it is unlikely that potential borrowers will fulfill their
credit needs and desires elsewhere because pawnbrokers tend to be lend-
ers of last resort or, at least, the last "legal" alternative. It would also
appear highly unlikely that loan sharks will resort to price competition.
It should be noted, however, that there 15robably is some price level at
which most borrowers would be unwilling to continue to frequent pawn-
shops. Likewise, there is surely a level of regulation at or beyond Which
165. Some states, such as North Dakota, appear to have no state regulation of pawnbrokers. See
N.D. CEm. CODE § 40-05-01(26) (1985). Many other states, however, have enacted "com-
prehensive" regulatory schemes. See, eg., IND. CODE §§ 28-7-5-1 to 28-7-5-37 (1986); N.J. REV.
STAT. §§ 45:22-1 to 45:22-34 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-12-1 to 56-12-16, 55-9-504 (1987);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 41-55 (McKinney 1988).
166. It appears that the following fifteen states have no state statutes regulating pawnbroker
interest rates: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin. See, e.g., NEB.
REv. STAT. ch. 69 §§ 201-210 (1986); UTAH CODE ANN. ch. 11 §§ 6-1, 6-4 (1986). Another eleven
states have statutory rates that are comparatively high: Connecticut, Kansas, Nevada, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington. See, e.g., S.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-39-100 (Law Co-op 1986) ($1 per thirty day period for each $10 loaned on loans
not in excess of $300); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-51.72 (Vernon 1986) (1-20% per
month depending on amount financed); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3867 (1986) (3% per month for
loans greater than $50 and 5% per month for loans less than $50); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.60.060
(1989) (If the amount loaned is greater than $126 per month, interest is charged at a rate of 3%. One
dollar per month in interest is charged if the amount loaned is under $20.). In many of the states
with no state statutes regulating pawnbroker interest rates, it may be possible that there are local
interest regulations. See, eg., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 140, § 72 (1986 & Supp. 1989). In Utah, local
governmental units are statutorily prohibited from engaging in rate setting. See UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 11-64 (1986).
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few entrepreneurs could,1 67 or would be willing to invest in a pawnbrok-
ing operation.
In jurisdictions where, because of extremely low rate ceilings, the
viability of any pawnshop would be in question, excessively restrictive
non-rate regulations would clearly sound the death knell. 168 The follow-
ing sections will briefly examine several types of regulation which could
prove most costly to existing pawnbrokers, or be the greatest barriers to
entry of new pawnbroking operations.
1. Licensing. 169 Pawnbrokers may be required to be licensed by
the state, by local governmental entities, or both. To the extent that the
licensing statutes require little more than notification to the governmen-
tal entity that a person is going to enter into the business of pawnbrok-
ing, 17  and the payment of a small administrative fee, licensing would
have little or no economic or competitive effect, and would unquestiona-
bly make administration of the "anti-fencing" types of police regulations
easier. Likewise, periodic renewals would be little more than a matter of
mailing the check to cover the small renewal fee. Even if the licensing
statutes were to require that licenses be issued only to persons or corpo-
rations whose officers are of good moral character, the economic or com-
petitive impact would be minimal.
Problems begin when the licenses are rationed, either by some quota
167. Indeed, in a jurisdiction where an aspiring pawnbroker needs to show "convenience and
advantage" to be licensed, the license may be denied if the regulatory body determines that addi-
tional pawnbroking outlets are not needed. See Sullivan, infra note 171, at 148.
168. In other than the current, relatively low interest times, it would seem inconceivable that
pawnshops could profitably operate at less than a three percent per month rate and even three per-
cent would be questionable unless the profits were augmented by non rate sources such as surplus
from pawn sales.
169. During the drafting of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the determination of proper
criteria for governing licensees proved to be such a headache that:
[a]t one point in the deliberations on the Code the Committee actually voted to junk the
licensing concept as a useless and expensive anachronism. Though this action was taken
in the heady atmosphere of the concluding minutes of an exhausting three-day meeting
and was notably short-lived (its reversal was the first order of business at the next meet-
ing), it is of interest that, in the recollection of the authors, both industry and consumer
representatives supported the decision. Jordan and Warren, The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 387, 430 (1968).
170. A "notification" type of license application would need to solicit little information beyond:
(a) the name of the owner; (b) the name of the business; (c) the address of the office, if different than
the place of business; (d) the addresses of all locations at which such business is conducted; and
probably (e) the name and address of the designated agent for service of process. Changes in infor-
mation could be reported at the next annual renewal.
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system, by a standard such as "convenience and advantage,"'' or by
minimum capital requirements. The process of obtaining a license then
becomes a much more costly venture, and those who have licenses have
less competitive incentive to keep prices in line.172 Excesses in price
could, in turn, predictably fuel arguments for continued or new rate reg-
ulation. Furthermore, in those jurisdictions in which there are restrictive
rate regulations, the cost of becoming licensed may well scuttle the ven-
ture by tipping pawnbrokering into the realm of unprofitability.
2. Bond Requirements. Like onerous licensing or minimum capital
requirements, bonding requirements can have anticompetitive effects. If
the required bond is fairly high, the bond premium may sink an other-
wise marginal operation. For instance, if the annual bond premium is 10
percent of the principal amount, a $3,000 bond requirement would be the
equivalent of an additional license fee of $300 per year. To the extent that
the bonds reasonably insure that pawnbrokers carry out their agreements
with the borrowers, or fulfill statutory requirements by providing a
source of indemnity if they do not, and to the extent that there is a signif-
icant risk of both breach or noncompliance and a resulting economic loss
to borrowers, bonding requirements might be justifiable or even desira-
ble. However, to the extent that bond requirements bear no reasonable
171. Several jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana and Penn-
sylvania, require license applicants to establish that the business will promote the convenience and
advantage of the community. The "convenience and advantage" criteria originiated in the fifth
draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law in 1932. Hubachek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of
Consumer Credit, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4, 17 (1954). The provision was an attempt to
curtail excesses resulting from a very competitive market. Sullivan, Administration ofa Regulatory
Small Loan Law, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 146, 148 (1941). It was feared that free entry would
cause a great influx of lenders into the market, drive lenders to illegal means to make profits and
stabilize rates at the maximum allowable, which would actually defeat competition.
172. As stated in U.C.C.C. § 3.503 Comments 1 & 2 (1974):
The purpose [of keeping licensing requirements at a minimum] is to facilitate entry into
the cash loan field so that the resultant rate competition fostered by disclosure will gen-
erally force rates [down]. A secondary purpose is to reduce the likelihood of establishing
localized monopolies in the granting of cash credit. Such monopolies tend to push rates
charged to the maximum permitted levels and to establish conditions under which some
share of the anticipated monopoly profits are devoted to direct or indirect pressures to
obtain the license.
In conjunction with recommendations for increased maximum rate allowances, the National Com-
mission on Consumer Finance recommended that the only criterion for entry (license) in the finance
company segment of the consumer market be good character, and that the right to market entry not
be based on any minimum capital requirements of convenience and advantage regulations. CON-
SUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 138 (1972). Though directed toward consumer finance
regulation, the above recommendation would seem even more pertinent to pawnbroker regulation.
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relation in purpose or amount to this surety function, they would seem to
be little more than arbitrary and capricious impediments to profitability.
As to amount, current statutory bond requirements seem to have
little relationship to anything other than legislative determinations of
how much the traffic will bear. Of the twenty-two jurisdictions that have
bond requirements, Oregon has the highest, $25,000, with New York in
second place with a $10,000 requirement. The lowest, $300, is required
by Massachusetts. Of the remaining nineteen jurisdictions, $1,000 and
$5,000 bond requirements seem the most popular with six states each.
Three states require a $500 bond, three states require a $2,000 bond, and
one state requires a $3,000 bond. 173 With the exception of Oregon and
New York, current bonding requirements, because of their negligible
size, should have minimal influence on the number of pawnbroking
outlets.
3. Sale Surplus. Whenever pawns are not redeemed by the end of
the contract or statutory holding period, the pawnbroker is authorized,
or in some jurisdictions required, to sell the pawn. 74 If sale is required,
public auctions are usually statutorily mandated. Absent contrary regu-
lation or agreement, to the extent that the sale proceeds exceed the
amount extended on the pawn plus interest, the pawnbroker has received
surplus which she will view as additional income. To the extent that the
sale proceeds are less than the amount extended on the pawn plus inter-
est, there is a deficiency and the pawnbroker will suffer a loss.
At least fifteen states175 require the surplus to be made available to
the borrower, but there is no corresponding requirement that the bor-
rower be responsible for deficiencies. In these jurisdictions, pawnbrokers
would be wise to conservatively value the pawns because there is no op-
portunity to offset surpluses against deficiencies. To make matters worse,
many of these same jurisdictions also have relatively low interest rate
ceilings. 176 In any event, pawnbrokers would have little incentive to en-
173. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.140 § 77 (1986 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 41
(McKinney 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 0726.0070 (1987).
174. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 48, 49 (McKinney 1988); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 281-23
(Purdon 1986) (mandatory); Wis. STAT. §§ 138.10(8), 138.10(8)(b) (1986) (mandatory).
175. Arizona, District of Columbia, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
176. See, eg., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1624 (1986) (2% per month); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 2-1909(a) (1986) (graduated from 2% per month down to 8% per year); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 281-
12 (Purdon 1986) (6% per year).
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courage sales of the goods at more than the amount of the original exten-
sion plus interest.
Arguably, the net effect of surplus repayment rules may differ by
jurisdiction. In jurisdictions with no or relatively high interest rate ceil-
ings, the effect would be to increase the cost of pawnbroker credit to all
through higher interest charges which would be necessary to offset the
loss of potential income from pawn sales surplus and to grant windfalls
to purchasers 177 at pawnbroking auctions. In those jurisdictions that
have relatively low interest rate ceilings, all possible avenues of profitabil-
ity would appear to be blocked, and few, if any, pawnshops could enter
or remain in the business.
V. SUMMARY
As we have seen, over the years pawnshops have been viewed by
many as valuable institutions, providing sources of credit for those who
would otherwise have no access to the credit market or who would be
forced to utilize illegal lenders and to suffer the resulting abuses. Like-
wise, various arguments have been made and reiterated as to why the
regulatory temptation should be resisted. In those jurisdictions where
pawnshop regulations have already reached overbearing proportions, the
regulations should be reviewed and selectively repealed. If it is agreed
that pawnshops are a worthwhile institution, hopefully it will also at least
be considered, if not conceded, that economic regulation, even though it
may be well meaning, does little to further the interests of the consumers
it serves. 178 Indeed, restrictive regulations of the type discussed above
could destroy it.
177. It is unlikely that pawnbrokers in this country have the degree of control over forfeiture
auctions that the Italian pawnbrokers' "gangs" are reputed to have over their auctions, but to the
extent that the pawnbroker or his privies may be the purchaser at a typically depressed sale price,
provisions regulating sale surplus may have little effect, on either economic or consumer protection.
178. See Engrnan, Dunham, Research for Uniform Consumer Credit Legislation, 20 Bus. LAW.
997 (1965); From our airways to our highways: How Government Regulation Has Become the Curse of
Consumerism, 2 BARRISTER 58 (1975); High, Consumer Credit Regulation in Texas-A Rejoinder by
an Economist, 50 TEx. L. REV. 463 (1972).
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